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1. INTRODUCTION 
The Q model, originally suggested by Tobin (1969) and rigorously derived by 
Hayashi ( 1982), is one of the most appealing theories of fixed capital invest-
ment. The model implies a relationship between a firm's rate of investment 
and the ratio of the value for the firm of an additional unit of capital to its 
replacement cost ('marginar Q). If Q is greater than unity, I it is optimal for 
the firm to invest. Empirical testing of the model is subject to certain condi-
tions under which Q, which is unobservable, is equal to an observable magni-
tude, 'average' Q, defined as the ratio of the market value of physical capital 
stock to its replacement cost. 
The leading model in the empirical investment literature has been, 
however, not the Q model but the neoclassical-cum-accelerator model, in 
which the rate of investment depends, essentially, on the user cost of capital 
and output changes. Both models stem from a general framework of 
optimisation of the present value of the firm's cash flow, under certain 
assumptions. In principie, the advantage of Q is that it involves the stock-
market valuation of the firm's capital, hence explicitly incorporating agents' 
expectations about the future return on the firm's capital. Econometric 
research estimating investment-Q equations with macroeconomic data (e.g. 
Clark, 1982) has, nonetheless, not been very successful. The main cause for 
this failure was initially thought to be the use of aggregate data: the theory 
provides a relationship between two ratios, which can hardly be linearly 
aggregated. 
This, and the fact that the components of Q lend themselves more readily 
to calculation at the micro level, led to the estimation of Q equations with 
* We wish to thank V. Aguirregabiria, M. Arellano, O. Bover, J. M. González-Páramo, J. 
Padilla, R. Repullo, V. Salas, two anonymous referees and the participants in a workshop at the 
Banco de España for their comments. OUT thanks also to J. Pérez, whose encouragement led us 
to research in this area; to L. Villanueva and the staff of the Central de Balances del Banco de 
España, for their help in obtaining the data; and to J. Saurina, for his assistance in calculating 
certain series and his comments. The authors alone are responsible for remaining errors. 
I A nOTmalized Q is normaIly used, so that the benchmark value is in fact zero (see 
Section 11). 
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data on individual firms, for Japan (e.g. Hoshi and Kashyap, 1990; Hayashi 
and Inoue, 1991), the United Kingdom (e.g. Blundell el al., 1992) and the 
United States (e.g. Schaller, 1990). The main results from this line of 
research, which are remarkably similar across countries, are that Q is signifi-
cantly correlated with investment but implied adjustment costs are too high, 
and that the residuals of investment-Q equations are correlated, thereby 
seemingIy pointing to specification problems. In sorne cases it has been found 
that this correlation might be compatible with the Q model (Blundell el al., 
1992) and also that part of such correlation seems attributable to the imposi-
tion of equal coefficients across firms with highIy heterogeneous behaviour 
(Schaller, 1990). 
That said, there still remains a basic problem revealed by the empirical 
testing of the model. While the theory implies that Q should be a sufficient 
statistic for investment, a common empirical finding is that variables whose 
information should already be incorporated into Q - essentially, the level of 
output/sales and financial variables - are significant when jointly induded 
with Q.2 These results suggest that key assumptions in the simplest version of 
the model, like those of perfect financial markets and perfect competition in 
product markets, are incorrect. Thus researchers have recently started to 
relax those assumptions. For example, Schiantarelli and Georgoutsos (1990) 
and Bond and Meghir (1991) present and test Q models with imperfect 
competition3 and liquidity constraints, respectively. 
In this paper we provide further international evidence on the validity of 
the Q theory by estimating investment equations over 1985-87 for a sample 
of 68 Spanish prívate industrial firms, which were quoted in the stock market 
and answered the survey of the Bank of Spain's Central Balance Sheet Office 
( Central de Balances del Banco de España). 
Previous work estimating investment equations with Spanish micro data 
(e.g. Espitia, 1985, or Giner, 1993) has found Q to be significant. Our first 
aim is thus to replicate this finding with a different data seto ' 
Our second goal is to test the relevance of a firm's financial position to its 
investment decisions, in the context of investment-Q equations. In this way 
we explore the robustness of the finding, by Mato (1988), that variables 
proxying for financial constraints suffered by Spanish firms have additional 
explanatory power, when included alongside with the usual variables of the 
neoclassical-cum-accelerator model (see Hernando and Vallés, 1992, as 
well). We also test, indirectly, for imperfect competition by including sales as 
a regressor in the investment equation. 
Our main findings are that Q is significant in the investment equation, but 
other variables proxying for liquidity constraints are also significant; that 
once those variables are induded, sales (which we introduce to check for 
2 The former variables are found to be significant by Schiantarelli and Georgoutsos (1990) 
and the latter by Fazzari el al. (1988). 
1 The existence of market power had already been taken into account in Hayashi (1982). but 
it had not been considered in most of the empiricalliterature. 
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market power) are not significant; and lastly that the adjustment costs implied 
by our estimated parameters are lower, and thus more reasonable, than those 
found in the international empiricalliterature. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 11 presents the equation we 
estimate, sample descriptive statistics of investment, the capital stock and Q, 
and the methods used to compute these variables (with the Appendix provid-
ing further details). Section 111 presents the results of estimating an equation 
relating fixed capital investment to Q and then to other variables, and dis-
cusses the results. Section IV draws our conclusions. 
n. THE MODEL AND THE DATA 
Themodel 
The Q model is well known, so its derivation need not be repeated here (see 
e.g. Hayashi, 1982). The simplest version of the model assumes that firms 
opera te under perfect competition and maximise the expected value of its 
current and future discounted cash fIow. 
The first order condition for such problem under the assumptions that the 
production and investment adjustment costs functions are homogeneous of 
degree one, that the latter is quadratic and subject to stochastic shocks and 
that adjustment of other factors of production is costless, can be written as: 
(1) 
where i indexes firms, t indexes time, 1 is gross investment and K is begin-
ning-of-period capital stock. The interpretation of the parameters is revealed 
by the assumed adjustment cost function: 
C¡¡(I¡JK¡,¡_¡) =(2f3t ¡ [(I¡JK¡,¡_¡)-(a+ y¡+ v¡JF ' (2) 
Le. there is a frictionless investment rate defined by three additive terms: a 
firm-invariant parameter, a, and two idiosyncratic terms, one constant, y¡, 
and the other stochastic, Vil' The scale parameter f3 is firm-invariant. 
Lastly, the regressor in equation (1) is 'average', tax-adjusted Q, defined as: 
Q¡¡=(1-h~-T¡Z¡)Pk¡¡(q;¡_l) (l-h~-T¡zJPk¡¡ ( _ V¡~-T¡A¡¡ 1) (3) 
(1 T¡)Pit (1 T¡)P¡¡ (1 h¡ T¡z¡)Pki/Ki/ 
where Vis the value of the firm, P the firm's output price, PI; the price of 
capital, T the tax rate on corporate profits, TA the present value of future 
depreciation tax allowances on formerly purchased but not yet fully depre-
ciated capital goods, h the unit investment tax credit, and Z the present value 
of depreciation tax allowances per unit of investment. The ratio q is the 
average value of capital, which - under the aboye assumptions - is equal to 
the ratio of the marginal value of capital to its price (Hayashi, 1982). 
3
52 BULLETIN 
Sample statistics and the construction of Q 
Our sample comprises a set of private industrial firms,4 which were quoted on 
the stock market in 1982-87 and which answered every year the survey of 
the Spanish Central Balance Sheet Office (CBSO).5 Computing Q is difficult, 
because we need both to identify the account items associated with economic 
variables and to estimate the market values of the former from their book 
values. The details of this process are described in the Appendix; here we 
merely wish to highlight a few issues.6 
First, while the stock market as ses ses all of a firm's assets, we are 
interested in investment on depreciable fixed capital only. Thus our measure 
of the value of capital ( V in equation (3)), ineludes the firm's liabilities, net of 
the market value of non-depreciable fixed capital, i.e. land and inventories. 
From this we subtract the present value of future tax savings through depre-
ciation allowances, using as discount factor a firm-specific interest rate, equal 
to the cost of the firm's borrowed funds. Similarly, the denominator of q 
contains the replacement cost of depreciable fixed capital only. This is 
broken down into four types of assets (buildings, machinery, transport equip-
ment and 'utility plants in service'), the market value of each being calculated 
with economic (instead of accounting) depreciation 'rates and own-price 
series. 
Second, the criteria followed in these calculations are unavoidably 
arbitrary and open to criticismo lndeed, our empirical analysis is performed 
with a sample of 68 firms, whereas the original sample contained 82 firms. 
For the remaining 14 firms, these criteria yield values for the components of 
Q that we consider to be atypical. Nevertheless, to check the robustness of 
our results, we re-ran the estimation with the total sample of 82 firms, not 
getting very different results.7 
The descriptive statistics of q and other variables are shown in Table 1. 
Attention is drawn to the high value of q in 1983, especially when compared 
with that in 1984. This is probably due to an understatement of capital in 
1982, the year immediately prior to a tax-free revision of asset book values. 
Even so, the capital stock seems somewhat understated even in 1983.!! As 
from 1984, both the mean and the standard deviation of q increase mono-
tonically, the latter in a greater proportion. For most firms q exceeds the unit 
value in 1986, though values much below and aboye unity do exist. 
The third aspect worth noting is that, due to lack of data on asset sales, 
investment is measured by the change in the balance sheet stock of fixed 
• Non-industrial and public firms are excluded, their investment decisions being thought not 
to be well captured by the usual models. 
5 The calculations to match the stock-market value of each firm to its financial statements 
were made by the CBSO, to ensure confidentiality. 
"Hoshi and Kashyap (1990) provide an excellent discussion of the problems entailed by 
constructing Q with accounting data. 
7 They are presented in Alonso and Bentolila (1992). 
x Since in our estimation we use data for 1985-87, this affects the set of instruments but not 
the regressors. 
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TABLE l 
Descriptive statistics 01< 
Year 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 
q ratio: 
Mean 0.93 0.84 0.98 1.32 1.43 
Standard deviation 0.40 0.40 0.60 0.74 0.96 
Maximum 2.40 2.51 3.18 3.38 4.18 
Minimum 0.24 0.23 0.20 0.25 0.32 
Q (regressor): 
Mean -0.07 -0.17 -0.01 0.32 0.44 
Standard deviation 0.43 0.41 0.60 0.75 0.99 
Gross investment 73.86 105.79 52.39 50.33 
Capital stock 524.74 893.99 1,012.97 1,073.06 1,102.92 
Investment rate 0.13 0.08 0.10 0.09 
Cash-flow rate 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.09 
Sales rate 1.38 1.26 1.27 1.27 
*Mean rates are unweighted. Gross investment and capital stock are in million dollars (at 
1991 exchange rates). 
Source: Bank of Spain's Central Balance Sheet Office survey and own computations. 
capital. This differs from the measure in other studies using data sets where 
the actual flow of investment expenditure is recorded. These two measures 
may differ considerably, e.g. when asset revaluation occurs. 
Table 1 shows that, contrary to q, the investment rate exhibits a decreasing 
path and also that this is not due to the way in which the capital stock is 
calculated, since gross investment (at book value) declines over time too. This 
dissimilar course is a forerunner of the difficulties we may encounter when 
attempting to estimate a relationship between the investment rate and q: On 
the other hand, the cash-flow and sales rates show increasing paths as from 
1985. 
III. ESTIMATION RESULTS 
Econometric issues 
We aim to test the first-order condition given by equation (1), i.e. that invest-
ment bears a contemporaneous relationship with Q, and that other variables 
whose information should already be incorporated into Q are not significant 
in an investment equation containing Q. This differs from the estimation of a 
structural investment equation, which, in particular, would require an addi-
tional equation explaining Q. An alternative interpretation, proposed by Abel 
and Blanchard (1986), is that we are describing the correlations present in the 
data between variables of interest. 
The estimation of equation ( 1) raises several econometric issues, of which 
we stress two. The first one is that Q should be correlated with the shock in 
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the equation (Le. it is endogenoust\ the second is that Q is likely to be 
measured with error (measurement of capital is difficult, valuation criteria are 
arbitrary, etc.). 
Both issues suggest that Q should be instrumented. On the one hand, 
endogeneity implies that it is very hard to find valid contemporaneous exter-
nal instruments. In the context of panel data estimation, however, we can use 
lags of endogenous variables as instruments. Our instrumental variables (IV) 
estimation is done with the generalised method of moments (with the DPD 
program by Arellano and Bond, 1988). We use the optimal matrix of instru-
ments, so that all right-hand-side variables dated t - 1 and earlier are 
included (which means that the number of instruments for each cross section 
is different) and exploit all the linear moment restrictions implied by the 
model (Arellano and Bond, 1991). On the other hand, the measurement 
error problem implies that the validity of specific lags as instruments will 
depend on the actual structure of such error. We shall go back to these issues 
below. 
The dependent variable is the investment rate, i.e. investment during the 
year divided by the capital stock at the beginning of the year. Another 
relevant issue is that the model posits a contemporaneous relationship 
between investment and Q. We do not have, however, continuous accounting 
data, but annual data. This suggests regressing yearly investment on an 
annual mean of Q calculated as the weighted average of the beginning- and 
end-of-year Q values. We prefer to use these two variables separately, to 
exploit the fact that the former (which we call'contemporaneous Q'), should 
be more immune to endogeneity bias than the latter ('leading Q'), in the sense 
that it can be treated as predetermined. 
We control partially for the presence of firm-specific adjustment costs by 
including sectoral dummies. 1O Time dummies are also included in order to 
capture macroeconomic phenomena affecting all firms equally. Despite diere 
being data for five years, the construction of the variables and the inclusion of 
lagged regressors reduce the estimation period to only three years, from 1985 
to 1987. 
Estimation 01 the investment-Q relationship 
We start by estimating the relationship in levels. Column (1) of Table 2 
presents the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation results. As explained 
aboye, potential endogeneity andJor measurement error imply that we should 
estimate by instrumental variables. Column (2) reveals, however, that the 
coefficient hardly changes when Q is instrumented. This suggests that neither 
the measurement error bias nor the endogeneity bias is large, or else that they 
roughly cancel each other. We perform a couple of regressions aimed at 
informally sorting out these explanations. 
y Shocks to the adjustment costs function will affect the value of the firm, which in turo will 
affect Q. 
10 The definition of the sectors appears in the Appendix. 
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Q 
Q+I 
mi 
m1 
W(JS) 
W(SD) 
ST 
TABLE2 
Estimation of the relationship between investment and Q 
Dependent variable: Investment rate 
OLS 
(1) 
0.039 
(3.51) 
0.95 
1.20 
40.91 
22.08 
IV 
(2) 
0.040 
(3.29) 
1.03 
1.11 
36.97 
25.51 
7.86 
OLS 
(3) 
0.031 
(3.76) 
1.11 
0.78 
42.92 
25.93 
NOTE: CriticaI vaIues (95% leveI) 
W(JS): X2(8) = 15.5. W(SD): X2(7) = 14.1. ST: X2(5) = 11.1. 
IV 
(4) 
0.040 
(3.87) 
1.28 
0.57 
39.58 
22.47 
8.35 
l. AII regressions inelude a constant and sectoral and time dummies. In coIumn (4) of TabIe 
3 sectoraI dummies are absent. 
2. Coefficients are two-step robust estimates. Heteroskedasticity-consistent (-ratios are 
reported below the estimated coefficients. 
3. Statistics: 
W(.)= WaId tests distributed as X2, with degrees offreedom provided below the tables. 
W(JS) ~ joint significan ce of the overaJl regression. 
W( SD) = joint significance of sectoral dummies. 
ST= Sargan Test of overidentifying restrictions, asymptoticaIly distributed as X2• 
mi and m2 = first- and second-order serial correlation statistics asymptoticaIly distributed 
as standard normal variates. 
4. Instrument sets: 
AII regressions: a constant, sectoraI and time dummies, and Q dated at (- 1 and earlier. In 
column (1) of Table 2 no instruments are used. In Table 3, CF/K dated at (- 1 and earlier is 
ineluded in alI cases; Y/K dated at (-1 and earlier is ineluded in column (3); and both sectoral 
dummies and Q dated at (- l are exeluded in column (4). 
A first approximation to the size of the endogeneity bias is given by the 
comparison of the OLS coefficients of contemporaneous and leading Q, 
since the former should be less subject to this type of bias than the latter. 
Column (3) reveals that both coefficients are quite similar. Since positive 
correlation between investment and Q is expected, finding a slightly lower 
coefficient on leading Q may be taken as an indication that the endogeneity 
bias is small. 
With regard to measurement error, it matters only if it is serially correlated, 
because then lagged Q would not be a val id instrument. This is not supported 
by the Sargan statistic, which is clearly below the critical value; but this test 
may not have much power in view of the small sample size. An informal test 
relies on checking whether the Sargan statistic falls when the first lag of Q, 
say, is excluded from the instrument set. When we do this the coefficient on Q 
changes little (it becomes 0.037) and the Sargan statistic is almost unchanged 
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(7.59), but since now there are only two overidentifying restrictions, the 
validity of the instrument set is rejected. This is not very conclusive, but in 
any event there is no strong evidence of correlated measurement error. These 
results suggest that neither endogeneity nor measurement error cause a large 
bias, though we should be cautious given the smaIl sample size. 
The estimates in levels just presented would be inconsistent if there exist 
unobservable fixed effects correlated with Q. To evaluate the incidence of 
this problem, we also estimate in first differences. Differencing generates a 
moving average structure in the error term (assuming it to be seriaIly uncorre-
lated in levels), which provides an additional reason to use the instrumental 
variables method. It turns out that the first-difference IV estimate is a statisti-
cally insignificant coefficient of 0.012, which is c1early below the estimate in 
levels. 11 This suggests the presence of individual effects correlated with Q. 
But in such cases we should find significant first- and second-order correla-
tion in the residuals in levels, which is not apparent in either column (1) or 
(2). In the foIlowing section, we argue that the disparity between the levels 
and differences estimates may not be due to fixed effects but to misspecifica-
tion of the equation causing an omitted variable bias. 
Before doing this we should make two points. The first one, derived from 
comparing columns (2) and (4), is that the estimated coefficient does not 
depend on using contemporaneous or leading q, a feature which will be 
useful later on. The second one is a feature common to all regressions in 
Table 2, i.e. the overall significance of the sectoral dummies which, in the 
context of the model, implies the heterogeneity of adjustment costs. Omission 
of those dummies would produce an inconsistent estimate of the Q coeffi-
cient. 
Testing the Q model 
We test the model by inc1uding additional variables other than Q, whi'ch -
according to the model - should not be significant. We select a variable 
seeking to capture liquidity constraints the firm may face: cash-flow or 
internal funds (CF), rescaled by the (beginning-of-period) capital stock. This 
choice is based on the usual find'ing that, for several reasons (e.g. asymmetry 
in the information available to the managers of the firm and potential 
creditors thereof), several sources of funds give rise to different costs, internal 
funds being the least costly and, therefore, preferred by firms. Colurno ( 1 ) of 
Table 3 shows that CF/K (instrumented with lags) is very significant, while 
both the coefficient and the significance of Q diminish. The same is true when 
leading Q is the regressor (colurno (2)). We read these results as consistent 
with the presence of credit constraints or financial hierarchy. 
11 Comparison of columns (2) and (4) reveals virtuaIly identicaI coefficients on contem-
poraneous and leading Q. In the first differences estimation we use leading Q. in order to 
employ aH three cross-sections (and exclude the first lag of Q from the instrument set). The 
OLS estimate in first differences is 0.0 I O. again insignificant. 
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TABLE3 
Q-model tests 
Dependent variable: lnvestment rate 
Levels 
(J) 
Q 0.021 
( 1.85) 
Q+I 
CF/K 0.350 
(2.89) 
Y/K 
mi 0.36 
m~ 0.52 
W(JS) 49.73 
W(SD) 24.96 
ST 15.83 
NOTE: See notes to Table 2. 
Critical values: 
Levels Levels 
(2) (3) 
0.035 
(3.19) 
0.021 
(2.58) 
0.322 0.363 
(2.57) (2.73) 
-0.001 
(0.24) 
0.48 0.81 
0.27 0.81 
50.76 55.29 
23.68 22.18 
12.97 20.89 
W(JS): X~(9)= 16.9. In column (3): x~(IO) = 18.3. In column (4): X~(2)= 5.99. 
W(SD): X~(7) = 14.1. 
ST: x~( 10) = 18.3. In column (3): x~( 15) = 25. 
CF/K =cash-tlow rate and Y/K = sales rate(see text). 
Differences 
(4) 
0.027 
(1.06) 
0.387 
(1.67) 
-3.48 
-1.45 
3.44 
18.11 
The rejection of the model might al so arise from firms operating in imper-
fectly competitive markets. Schiantarelli and Georgoutsos (1990) fonpulate 
and estimate a Q model under monopolistic competition. The appropriate 
regressors in their model are current and leading Q, leading investment and 
current debt and output. Given the smaIl size of our data set, we do not 
attempt to test such a model. Alternatively, we test the simplest Q model by 
including, as an additional regressor, sales rescaled by beginning-of-period 
capital (Y/K). The result, shown in colurno (3), is surprising. Once Q and 
CF / K are included, sales are not significant. Moreover, this happens in alI the 
a1ternative econometric specifications we have tried, whereby no estimation 
including sales as a regressor is presented hereafter. The sales variable may 
contain a sizeable measurement error, owing to the accounting distortions 
caused by the introduction of value added tax (VAT) in 1986 (see the 
Appendix). We should note, moreover, that sales are significant when Q is 
included but internal funds are not included, seemingly indicating that both 
variables capture Iiquidity constraints, the latter more accurately. 
For the reasons stated in the previous subsection, we also estimate in first 
differences. Given how little the estimated coefficients in levels depend on 
9
58 BULLETIN 
whether contemporaneous or leading Q is used, we choose the latter in order 
to exploit all three cross sections. Column (4) shows that the results are 
similar to those in levels, but now the variables are not significant. The Sargan 
test is elose to rejecting the validity of the instrument set. 
In summary, adding cash-flow as a regressor yields two results. First, the 
coefficient of Q is not too sensitive to whether estimation is performed in 
levels or first differences. 12 And second, there is no trace of first or second 
order correlation in the residuals in either column (1) or (2). Both findings 
suggest that there is no obvious problem of correlation between fixed-effects 
and regressors. This may be taken as an indication that the disparity found in 
the previous section can be explained by an omitted variable bias. As a result, 
we infer that the equation ineluding only Q is misspecified, i.e. that the first 
order condition of the simplest Q model is invalido 
Since we have found significantly different coefficients depending on 
whether or not a cash-flow variable is ineluded in the regression, and given 
the small number of observations available, we think it safer to conelude that 
the coefficient of Q is the investment equation lies between 0.02 and 0.04. 
F urther discussions 01 the results 
We also estimated a set of regressions trying to check the sensitivity of the 
estimates to the way the variables are defined. We tried using modified 
measures of internal funds (in which corporate taxes and dividends paid out 
from profits were subtracted) and of the market value of the capital stock (in 
which we do not take the 1983 book values as the market values, but estimate 
the average age of capital to adjust book values for inflation and deprecia-
tion). The qualitative results remain unchanged, so we do not present them 
here. IJ 
lt is interesting to compare our results with those found in previous work. 
The comparison is difficult for several reasons. Not all authors define fixed 
assets in the same way; for example, sorne of them inelude assets that we have 
excluded here, like land or inventories. AIso, sorne authors use direct data on 
investment (net of asset sale~), while we can only observe net changes in the 
book value of capital. 
In any event, let us compare the estimated implicit adjustment costs. 
These can be retrieved by multiplying half of the inverse of the estimated Q 
coefficient by the square of the difference between the investment rate and 
the rate at which no costs are borne (see equation (2)). Let us assume that this 
difference is 5 percent. 14 Our estimates of f3 (once CF / K is ineluded) range 
from 0.021 (levels) to 0.027 (differences), which imply marginal adjustment 
cost of 5 to 6 percent. These costs were 2 percent in a previous estimation 
12 We cannot statistically reject the equality of the estimates in columns (2) and (4). 
1] The reader can find them in Alonso and Bentolila ( 1992). 
14 Namely, that the adjustment cost is (1/2fJ) (0.05)2. 
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with Spanish panel data over the period 1963-88, by Giner (1993). The two 
estimates are not strictIy comparable for the kind of reasons mentioned 
aboye, but it is reasonable that his estimate is lower, since he ineludes inven-
tories in the capital stock (which should have much lower adjustment costs). 
Our estimate seems more reasonable than those found for other countries, 
which are normaHy too high, the reason being that our estimated regression 
coefficient is higher. For instance, the estimation by Hoshi and Kashyap 
(1990) with Japanese data of a Q coefficient of 0.01, which is the highest in 
the intemational empiricalliterature with panel data that we know of, implies 
marginal adjustment costs of 11 percent. 
Do our resuIts imply the rejection of the Q model in the Spanish case? We 
believe so, at least in the model's simplest form, i.e. under the usual assump-
tions of perfect competition in goods markets, perfect capital markets, con-
stant returns to scale and linearly homogeneous convex adjustment costs. But 
our answer needs to be qualified for a host of reasons briefly discussed below. 
(a) The variable indicated by the model is the so-called marginal Q, 
whereas we use average Q. The set of assumptions required for both to 
coincide are barely likely to arise in reality, so that variables other than Q 
may help explain investment. However, the only paper we know of which 
constructs an approximate measure of marginal Q (Abel and Blanchard, 
1986) obtains very similar resuIts to those with average Q (though with 
aggregate data). 
(b) We use data on four types of capital goods and apply different price 
indices and depreciation rates for each. But we then compute the capital 
stock as the simple sum of the amounts of these types of assets. The theory of 
investment with multiple capital goods proves (Wildasin, 1984) that this 
approximation requires a very strong assumption: the separability of adjust-
ment costs for different asset types. In its absence, the rate of investrpent 
should be measured by the rate of change of an aggregate index of the stocks 
of the different capital goods. Nonetheless, the use of this method for a 
sample of Japanese firms, in Hayashi and Inoue ( 1991), does not yield very 
different results from those obtained with the procedure we foHow. 
(c) In our measure of the firm's market value, we use the stock market 
valuation in a single day at the end of the fiscal year, which could contain a 
high level of noise. The resuIts for other countries lead us to think, however, 
that a measure of Q with a time-averaged stock market valuation would not 
radically alter our resuIts. 
(d) The estimation exercises in which we use the end-1987 Q (Le. those in 
which leading Q is used) may be distorted by the stock market crash in 
October that year. The theory does not specify how firms should behave if 
they think the stock market price differs from that warranted by the funda-
mentals, due, for example, to the presence of bubbles. If they decide to dis-
regard the former in favour of fundamentals, we would expect the Q 
coefficients to faH at times of 'unwarranted' stock market surges (Hoshi and 
Kashyap, 1990, obtain such a resuIt for Japan). In contrast, we do not find 
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major differences between the coefficients estimated with beginning- and 
end-of-period Q. 
IV. CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper we estimate Tobin's Q for a set of 68 Spanish private industrial 
firms over the period 1983-87. We then estimate the relationship between 
the investment rate and Q, and test the prediction of the simplest Q model, 
namely that Q is a sufficient statistic for investment. 
The paper makes three main points. The first is that Q is significant in an 
equation for investment in fixed capital, thus confirming previous results by 
other authors for the Spanish case (Espitia, 1985, and Giner, 1993). The 
significance of Q, and specially the fact that the estimates of adjustment costs 
derived from our estimation are more reasonable than those found for other 
countries, may come as a surprise once we take into account the under-
developed nature of the Spanish stock exchange. This market has tradi-
tionally been very small, with few firms accounting for a very large proportion 
of the trading volume, it operated with a periodic call or batch system in a 'cry 
out' form and was 'particularly vulnerable to manipulation ( ... ) with half of all 
orders placed through commercial banks which also have enormous holdings 
in industrial and service companies' (Rubio, 1990, p. 338). In these circum-
stances, the stock market is unlikely to provide a good estimate of the market 
values of firms and so we would not expect Q to be strongly correlated with 
investment. We sympathise with this view, although it might be argued that 
mispricing need not be positively correlated with trading volume (due to the 
presence, e.g. of noise traders).15 The explanation of our relatively favourable 
results might líe in the important changes undergone by the Spanish stock 
exchange in the 1980s, when relatively large increases in trading volumes and 
foreign investment took place, making it a more transparent and ,efficient 
market (see Rubio, 1990 ).16 
Our second contribution is to have found that the simplest version of the Q 
model is rejected, owing to the significance of financial variables. The latter 
aspect confirms for Spain the results obtained for other countries (for 
instance, Blundell et al., 1992, for the United Kingdom, or Fazzari et al., 
1988, for the United States) and by other researchers for the Spanish case 
using neoclassical-cum-accelerator models (Mato, 1988, Hernando and 
Vallés, 1992). This suggests - albeit in the absence of a more structured 
theoretical framework - that Spanish firms face liquidity constraints, pre-
sumably due to imperfections in financial markets. These constraints may 
plausibly be more binding in a country, such as Spain, where financial 
markets are still insufficiently developed. 
15 This point was made by an anonymous referee. 
11> Although this would not explain the results of Giner (1993), which cover a much larger 
period, This author provides an altemative explanation relying on the idea that intangible 
capital (Le. 'goodwill', etc.), which may affect Q but not investment, would be less important in 
Spanish firms than abroad, causing a larger coefficient on Q in Spain than in other countries. 
12
INVESTMENT AND Q IN SPANISH MANUFACTURING FIRMS 61 
Thirdly, unlike the evidence for other countries, we find no additional 
explanatory power in a firm's sales once Q and cash-f1ow are included. In 
principIe, this should be interpreted as indicative of perfect competition in 
Spanish manufacturing. We are reluctant to advocate this interpretation for 
several reasons: we are not really testing the proper equation derived from Q 
models with imperfect competition (cfr. SchiantareIli and Georgoutsos, 
1990), there is sorne empírical evidence of oligopolistic behaviour in Spanish 
manufacturing (e.g. Mazón, 1992) and, lastly, there are problems in the 
measurement of sales in our sample due to the introduction of VAT in 1986. 
Lastly, we believe that the main Iimitation of our analysis arises from the 
small number of cross sections and firms we draw on. The former circum-
scribes the validity of our results, insofar as the coefficients estimated may 
strongly depend on the aggregate shocks during the sample period. 1 7 The 
importance of this problem can only be diminished with a long sample 
periodo Furthermore, the Iimited number of firms means that our sample is 
not representative of most Spanish industrial firms; these, generally, do not 
have access to the stock market for fund-raising purposes. Only with time 
may both aspects be improved. 
Universidad Complutense and CEMFI, Madrid 
CEMFI, Madrid 
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APPENDIX. DEFINITIONS OF VARIABLES 
A firm's average, tax-adjusted q is given by: 
q¡ =( V¡- 'r¡A¡)(i:.j=t (1- h¡- 'r¡z{) p{¡ K{ 
where V is the market value of the firm, i.e. the sum of net debt plus equity 
less land and inventories. Superscript j denotes capital goods types. The 
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variable Q normalises and express es q in terms of the firm's product prices, P 
(with weights w explained below), Le.: 
Q, =(q, -1)[l:}=1 (1 - h, - T,z{)w{P{,l/[(1- T,)P,l 
The calculation of these variables was carried out as follows: 
1. Equity. Number of shares times the stock market price in the year-end 
session. (Source: Official Bulletins of the Madrid, Barcelona and Bilbao Stock 
Exchanges, and Banco de Bilbao's Agenda Financiera). 
2. Net debt. Difference between gross debt and financial assets. Debt 
ineludes reserves akin to debt, but exeludes capital-equivalent ones. Gross 
debt at market value, D, is computed as: D = DSB + ¡,tDLB, with DSB the 
book value of short-term debt, DLB that of medium- and long-term debt and 
¡,t a revaluation factor, equal to a calculated market value of debt (financial 
expenses divided by interest rate on electricity company bonds) divided by 
the book value of total debt. The same method is applied to financial assets, 
using the interest rate on government debt. For intangibles, we take the book 
value as market value. 
3. Capital stock and investment. The survey breaks down the physical capital 
stock into four categories: (1) Buildings and other structures, (2) Utility plants 
in service, (3) Machinery, equipment and tools, (4) Transport equipment. 
We use a UFO-type recursive valuation formula, which requires an 
estimate of the market value in the first sample year. We take the 1983 book 
value as the market value in that year. From then on we update the market 
value of the capital stock (KM) in the following way: 
KM{ =[KM{_I (PL/PL-I) + G/{]( 1 - Oi) 
which assumes that depreciation occurs, at rate O, at the end of the ye'ar and 
gross nominal investment, G/, at the beginning. 
Rates of depreciation for all assets but (2) are calculated by weighting the 
dissaggregated estimates of economic depreciation rates by Hulten and 
Wykoff ( 1981 ) for the US, using as weights the inputs of capital goods in each 
sector according to the 1980 Spanish input-output tables. The latter are also 
used in the construction of price indices for the four types of capital goods, as 
weights of official capital goods price indices. Both calculations are done for 
each of the two-digit groups in the Spanish National Classification of 
Economic Activities (CN AE). 18 
Utility plants in service are combinations, for accounting purposes, of 
several types of capital goods (essentially machinery and buildings). In fact, 
IX Except for sectors 151 and 152, which have been kept separate because of their hetero-
geneity. 
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their accounting depreciation rates always lie in between the economic 
depreciation rates of those two types of assets, so we calculate their deprecia-
tion rate from the accounting rates, assuming straight-line depreciation, Le.: 
ói=(1/6)~19H7 (ADi/KBi) ,= 19H2 , , (j=2) 
where AD is the annual provision for depreciation and KB the book value of 
capital. This should, of course, be thought of only as an approximation to the 
exponential depreciation rate. 
As to investment, no data are available on sales of assets, so we approxi-
mate it by the change in book values: 
GI{ = KB{ - KB{ _ I + AD{ 
4. Land. We follow the same procedure as for capital. No land price index is 
available, so we use the price index for buildings. 
5. lnventories. The data contain no information on the inventory valuation 
methods applied by firms. We adopt the average pricing method of Linden-
berg and Ross (1981), so that the market value of inventories, XM, is equal 
to: 
XM, =XB,[P,,/!(Pr , + Pr.,-I)] 
where XB and Pr are, respectively, the book value and the price of inven-
tories. 
6. Tax adjustment. Tax rate (r): 35 percent of the tax base. Investment tax 
credit (h): 12 percent of the tax base for 1983-84, 15 percent as from 1985. 
Depreciation: We apply the depreciation system permitted by law providing 
the largest present value of tax allowances and then calculate (using the 
formulae in González-Páramo, 1991) the present values of current and future 
credits of investments made in the current and previous years. The discount 
rate is approximated by the cost of borrowed funds for each firm, Le. the ratio 
of financial expenses to total debt. 
7. Computation of Q on the basis of q. To compute Q, q is multiplied by the 
price of capital and divided by the firm's output price. The former is calcu-
lated by weighting, with weights w, the price indices of each type of capital 
good by the proportion they account for in the firm's total nominal capital 
stock: 
, .• i = KB /"<;'4 KBi 
"', flM<i=1 , 
The firm's price index is found by weighting the industrial price indices of 
the types of goods produced by the firm (2-digit CNAE classification) by 
their share in the firm's nominal sales in 1983. 
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8. Internal finance and sales. Definitions: Internal finance ( CF ) = Accounting 
profits (losses) + Depreciation provisions + Operating provisions + Bad debts 
written off + Other provisions + Deferred eamings. Sales: Before 1986 we do 
not know the amount of indirect taxation included in sales. Thus we are 
forced to use sales gross of taxes. The introduction of VAT in 1986 creates an 
artificial jump in the series because the VAT rates are higher than previous 
indirect tax rates. 
9. Sectoral dummies (number of firms in parentheses). Energy ( 12), Water (2) 
- excluded from the regressions -, Steel (10), Construction materials, glass 
and ceramics (5), Chemicals (12), Non-ferrous metal s (10), Food (6), Other 
(11 ). 
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